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Abstract: Throughout his career, Jean-Paul Sartre had a contentious theoretical relationship with psychoanalysis. Nowhere is this more evident than in his criticisms of the concept of the unconscious. For him, the unconscious represents a hidden psychological depth that is anathema to the notion of human freedom. In this paper, I argue that Lacan’s conception of the unconscious-structured-like-a-language overcomes many of Sartre’s most damning objections. I demonstrate that Lacan shares with Sartre a concern to rid the psyche of hidden depths. Both thinkers therefore reject the depth psychological conception of the unconscious and arrive at strikingly similar positions on the nature of the unconscious. In this way, I show that the conceptual analogues that Sartre develops in order to avoid the psychoanalytic unconscious lead him to a position on the unconscious with which Lacan could be in agreement. This indicates that Sartre’s philosophical position is not as at odds with Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis as is typically thought.





There are a number of apparent obstacles to affecting a rapprochement between Sartre and psychoanalysis. As is well known, Sartre deems the unconscious anathema to his existentialist conception of freedom. Sartre gives several reasons for rejecting the unconscious along these lines. To begin with, the existence of a directive power existing outside the bounds of conscious awareness implies that one is not really in control of one’s thoughts and actions, despite appearances to the contrary. In addition, according to Sartre, the Freudian unconscious is a reified, thing-like entity similar in form to the transcendental ego with which he tries to dispense in much of his early work.​[1]​ Specifically as regards Lacanian psychoanalysis, an additional problem must be confronted. For any project wishing to align the concerns of Sartre and Lacan must contend with the antagonistic relationship between existentialism and structuralism. Interestingly, however, it is precisely Lacan’s conception of the structured unconscious that overcomes many of Sartre’s criticisms of this most crucial of psychoanalytic concepts. 
Herein, I will be departing from the approach taken in the bulk of scholarship that examines the relationship between Sartre and Lacan. The majority of published work on this topic tends to focus on Sartre’s distinction between ego and subject as elaborated especially in 1937’s The Transcendence of the Ego and the similarities it bears to Lacan’s account of the distinction between ego and subject as it is developed most famously in the “Mirror Stage” écrit (importantly, however, these distinctions are not without relevance to my subsequent remarks).​[2]​ In particular, I hope to examine some underexplored territory in this project by developing the implications of a statement that Sartre makes in a 1969 interview conducted for New Left Review that could potentially relieve some of the tension that marks his various engagements with psychoanalysis. Therein, Sartre states that apart from his concerns about the deterministic implications of the concept of the unconscious, one of his chief complaints about psychoanalytic theory, especially regarding the manner in which the unconscious is conceptualized, is that it is not dialectical. Taking the Oedipus complex as his example, Sartre declares, “the fact is that analysts manage to find everything in it, equally well the fixation on the mother, love of the mother, or hatred of the mother, as Melanie Klein argues. In other words, anything can be derived from it, since it is not structured” (Sartre 2008, 38; emphasis in original). A few lines later, he continues, “But this is precisely what I am not sure of: I am convinced that complexes exist, but I am not so certain that they are not structured” (Sartre 2008, 38). 









Lacan on the Structure of the Unconscious 


With the popularization of structuralism in French philosophy owing a large debt to Claude Lévi-Strauss​[3]​, it is typically thought that structuralism seeks to do away with notions of consciousness and subjectivity, notions that are absolutely crucial to existential phenomenology. Jean-Michel Rabaté notes that, “Most accounts of Structuralism tend to portray it as the radical enemy of any philosophy of consciousness, therefore of phenomenology, a study of the way in which consciousness constitutes a world” (Rabaté 2003, 5). Peter Caws remarks similarly that, “The Structuralists” made an attempt at “thoroughly decentering the subject, or decentering the world in a stronger sense by removing the subject from it” (Caws 2000, 239). 
Psychoanalysis first inserted itself into French structuralism by way of Lacan, in particular, his 1950s-era “return to Freud” during which he makes heavy use of structuralist linguistics to elaborate his notion of the symbolically structured unconscious. What many see in Lacan that is not available in Lévi-Straussian or Althusserian structuralism — two of the movement’s more prominent strains — is the preservation of the concept of subjectivity. As Jacques-Alain Miller notes in his seminal essay “Action of the Structure”, the “objects” of “psychoanalytic structuralism” are “experiences”. There is “an ineliminable subjectivity situated in these experiences” (Miller 2012, 71). Psychoanalysis provides a means for thinkers like Miller and his ilk to develop what they regard as a radically new conception of the subject, one that appears to have far less agency than the typical phenomenological conception but that nevertheless preserves the notion of the subject, however “subjected” it might be. And it is Lacan, with his refusal to give up the notion of the subject, who provides the exponents of this version of structuralism with their primary inspiration.​[4]​  
	On a first approach, then, there is at least some bridgeable ground between Sartre and Lacan, with both thinkers wishing to retain the concept of subjectivity in opposition to several attempts to dispense with it. But, even in preserving the notion of the subject, Lacan propounds a theory according to which human beings are heavily subjected to the determining influence of the symbolic order in which they are immersed even prior to their birth. In the écrit “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, Lacan makes this point in no uncertain terms: 
Symbols in fact envelop the life of man with a network so total that they join together those who are going to engender him ‘by bone and flesh’ before he comes into the world; so total that they bring to his birth… the shape of his destiny; so total that they provide the words that will make him faithful or renegade, the law of the acts that will follow him right to the very place where he is not yet and beyond his very death; and so total that through them his end finds its meaning in the last judgment, where the Word absolves his being or condemns it. (Lacan 2006, 231)

Importantly, one’s place in the symbolic order plays a significant role in the formation of the structured unconscious. 
It is statements like this that lead authors such as Betty Cannon to view the theoretical projects of Sartre and Lacan as diametrically opposed and therefore irreconcilable. In her 2016 article “What Would I Do with Lacan Today?”, a short sequel of sorts to her 1991 book Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existentialist Challenge to Clinical Metatheory, she states: 
Lacan defines the unconscious subject, the linguistic unconscious, as that which makes each of us an ‘effect of the signifier’… Lacanian analysis, as I read Lacan, leads us not to recognizing and assuming our freedom, but to a kind of Nietzschean amor fati — an acceptance/love of the fact of being the plaything of the signifying chain that moves down to us from our ancestors. (Cannon 2016, 16)

Lacan’s structuralism is to blame here. In Sartre and Psychoanalysis, she writes, “structuralism is really a new scientific positivism, a synchronic rather than a diachronic positivism, but one which is nonetheless as reductionistic as traditional Freudian metatheory” (Cannon 1991, 14). Later, in the same volume, she insists that we can see the stark contrast between Sartre and Lacan, “if we place [that difference] within the larger context of Sartre’s dialogue with structuralism…” (Cannon 1991, 256). Cannon argues that structuralism in all its forms fails to account for the intentional activity of the human subject. Specifically as regards Lacan, she states, “Lacan… errs in attempting to reduce everything to linguistic structure without adding human intentionality and meaning” (Cannon 1991, 259).
	The deck thus appears stacked against a merger between Sartrean existentialism and Lacanian psychoanalytic structuralism. However, there is some evidence to support the view that Sartre is more sympathetic to a Lacanian approach to the unconscious than is obvious at first glance. To return to the passage I quoted at the outset of this paper, Sartre declares that one of his concerns about the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and its formations is that it is not structured, which, for him, means that psychoanalysis theorizes the unconscious as a kind of jumbled mess onto which any interpretation whatsoever may be justifiably projected. This provides a key starting point for considering the potential resonances between Sartre and Lacan. The latter, against most prevailing psychoanalytic conceptions of the unconscious, postulates that unconscious mental processes are themselves structured in a manner as rigorous as that of language. As is well known, Lacan spent a large portion of his teaching career railing against the ego psychological conception of the unconscious as a collection of wild, unthinking impulses. For Lacan, this conception dramatically distorts Freud’s discovery. In his eleventh seminar, Lacan elaborates the specificity of the Freudian unconscious in contrast to other, competing conceptions. Rather than referring simply to that which is non-conscious, the Freudian unconscious designates an elaborate network of thought that expresses itself in ways different from conscious thought but, for all that, is not any less complex: 
To all these forms of unconscious, ever more or less linked to some obscure will regarded as primordial, to something preconscious, what Freud opposes is the revelation that at the level of the unconscious there is something at all points homologous with what occurs at the level of the subject — this thing speaks and functions in a way quite as elaborate as at the level of the conscious, which thus loses what seemed to be its privilege. (Lacan 1977, 24)

The unconscious, then, far from being the province of an unstructured, untamed jumble of id-propelled desires is portrayed by Lacan as being quite sophisticated in and of itself. As Slavoj Žižek puts the point, “The Freudian Unconscious caused such a scandal not because of the claim that the rational self is subordinate to a much vaster domain of blind irrational instincts, but because it demonstrated how the unconscious itself obeys its own grammar and logic — the unconscious talks and thinks” (Žižek 2014, 163). 
	What is at stake in Lacan’s account of unconscious structuration? What precise advantages does his distinctive approach offer to psychoanalytic metapsychology? Most importantly for my purposes here, an emphasis on unconscious structure permits dispensing with a depth psychological understanding of the unconscious; this is a move that will prove crucial to my efforts to demonstrate the substantial common ground shared between Sartre and Lacan. The typical understanding of the unconscious presents it in imagistic terms as the large, unseen portion of an iceberg that sits below the visible surface of the water. There are several problems plaguing this idea, many of which Sartre himself astutely diagnoses and critiques. Likewise, for Lacan, the depth psychological reading of the unconscious is responsible for many of psychoanalysis’ most problematic aspects, in particular, its vague notions of libidinal energy and affect. Adrian Johnston highlights this association for Lacan: “As early as 1955, Lacan is adamant about [inverting] the priority of energy over structure. He perceives a deep-seated complicity between psychoanalysis’ pseudoscientific energetics and the depth psychological reading of Freud: Psychical energy is a fundamental ‘substance’ issuing from the libidinal cauldron of an instinctual, interior id” (Johnston 2005, 199). On this view, which Lacan associates most especially with ego psychology, the unconscious is equated with the id of Freud’s second topography as a realm of wild drives to be tamed by the rational ego. 
(Incidentally, this is an important reason for Lacan’s privileging of the first topography over the second.) 
As already noted, Lacan departs from this understanding of the unconscious as a swirling collection of conflicted, desirous impulses, opting instead to attribute to primary process psychical operations a level of sophistication typically reserved only for conscious thought. The distinctive features that Freud identifies as belonging to unconscious thought in his 1915 metapsychological paper on the topic establish certain decisive differences from consciousness: “The distinction we have made between the two psychical systems receives fresh significance when we observe that processes in the one system, the Ucs., show characteristics which are not met with again in the system immediately above it” (Freud 1957, 186). The principal qualities Freud identifies as belonging to the unconscious are timelessness, the primacy of psychical over external reality, the absence of negation, and the mobility of cathexes (Freud 1957, 186-187). But, for Lacan, though the nature of unconscious thought is different from conscious thought, it does not operate in a less cunning or sophisticated fashion. Underestimating the complexity of the unconscious is an error he charges psychoanalysts from various other schools of thought with making; he repeatedly insists that the majority of psychoanalysts misrecognize the primary object of their investigations, mistaking it for the comparatively dumb instinctual reservoir of the id. Indeed, Lacan regards the failure of the psychoanalytic establishment to recognize the structure of the unconscious as one of its greatest missteps. He identifies it as “the most striking flaw in analytic doctrine: the neglect of the structural in favor of the dynamic” (Lacan 2001, 51).
	Lacan’s recourse to Saussurian and Jakobsonian linguistics emphasizes the structural features he attributes to the unconscious. As is well known, he associates the phenomena of condensation and displacement, identified by Freud as two key features of primary process mentation, with the linguistic tropes of metaphor and metonymy, respectively. By conceiving the operations of the unconscious in this way, Lacan offers a way to acknowledge the idiosyncratic nature of primary process-style thinking, attributing to it all of the distinctive features Freud identifies (timelessness, absence of negation, and so on) while not giving up the idea that it is rigorously structured. Echoing Lacan’s point, Alphonse de Waelhens remarks, “the claim that unconscious discourse does not obey the rules of logic is ambiguous. It is true that conscious discourse is different… But does this imply that there can be no logic of desire? Not at all, and it is enough to read Freud to be convinced” (De Waelhens and Ver Eecke 2001, 263). 
What, then, provides the structural foundations of the unconscious? Put simply, for Lacan, the unconscious is structured by signifiers. In the écrit “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud”, he explains the centrality of the signifier to psychoanalytic theory and practice. Again highlighting his opposition to the ego psychological view according to which the unconscious consists in a kind of hidden depth, Lacan states, “My title conveys the fact that, beyond this speech, it is the whole structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious. This is to alert prejudiced minds from the outset that the idea that the unconscious is merely the seat of the instincts may have to be reconsidered” (Lacan 2006b, 413). In this écrit, Lacan proceeds to argue for the primacy of the signifier over the signified. This further signals Lacan’s emphasis on the surface of things over against any hidden depth. Rather than tracing the signifier to what lies behind it (the signified), Lacanian psychoanalysis focuses on signifiers themselves and their structural position in relation to other signifiers. A basic lesson of Saussurean linguistics is that phonemic differences constitute the basic differential elements upon which linguistic significance and meaning is constructed. For Lacan, the unconscious is structured along precisely these lines; the constituents of the unconscious qua signifiers achieve their status through their differential relations to other signifiers, both conscious and unconscious. 
Now, we are in a position to see how Lacan’s conception of the unconscious as structured like a language allows us to move beyond depth psychological readings. Rather than constituting an unknown, hidden depth, the unconscious, for Lacan, is stitched into the very fabric of conscious life. The unconscious interjects itself into the utterances and activities of everyday life. And this because the unconscious is inherent to the structure of the psyche. That is, both conscious and unconscious psychical material are what they are by virtue of their structural position within the psyche. Each reciprocally structures the other in a fashion akin to the phonemes that constitute natural languages. Lacan’s uses of topography and knot theory among other fields are attempts to explain the psyche in terms different than standard spatial depictions of it. As a favorite Lacanian reference has it, like the Moebius band that allows one to traverse what appears as two distinct sides along a single surface, the unconscious functions on the same plane as the conscious. Johnston spells this Lacanian point out nicely in his recent book-length treatment of “The Freudian Thing”. He writes:
The primary processes of [the unconscious] are no less formed than the expressions voiced in free-associational monologues… this observation is meant to highlight Lacan’s opposition to all pseudo-Freudianisms in which the unconscious is conflated with the depth-psychological id. By contrast with the dark, roiling waters of brute, dumb forces from the past of a prehistorical time-before-time, unconscious truths, as forming a structured network shot through with socio-symbolic mediations, are ‘out there,’ inscribed in, through, and between the lines of manifest everyday life and its psychopathologies (both quotidian and otherwise). (Johnston 2017, 37)

From a Lacanian perspective, rather than being a depth forever unknowable in itself, the unconscious is part and parcel of the life of the subject, shining through in its speech and action. 

Sartre and the Lacanian Unconscious 


How does the preceding account allow for an integration of the Lacanian structured unconscious and Sartre’s own theorizations about the more opaque dimensions of human psychical life? Beginning with The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre develops several conceptual analogues to the unconscious. The first of these, namely, pre-reflective consciousness which serves as the basis of his distinction between ego and subject, may be regarded as an initial attempt at navigating around the depth psychological reading of the unconscious. It heralds a prominent theme that characterizes much of Sartre’s early work, namely, ridding the subject of any psychical content. This idea finds its articulation in the introduction to Being and Nothingness where Sartre writes, “The first procedure of a philosophy ought to be to expel things from consciousness…” (Sartre 1956, 11). The emphasis on consciousness here aside, Sartre’s claims along these lines indicate a profound sympathy between his and Lacan’s efforts to rid the psyche of any hidden depths. For Sartre, there is no “inner world”: “There is no longer an ‘inner life’… because there is no longer anything which is an object and which can at the same time partake of the intimacy of consciousness. Doubts, remorse, the so-called ‘mental crises of consciousness,’ etc. — in short, all the content of intimate diaries — become sheer performance” (Sartre 1960, 93-94; emphasis in original). 
Throughout his intellectual itinerary, Sartre maintains his views about a “contentless” psyche while becoming increasingly sympathetic to the idea that not everything that comprises subjective life is strictly conscious. After introducing the notion of pre-reflective consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, many of Sartre’s subsequent major works offer modified or new conceptual alternatives to the psychoanalytic unconscious. His existential biographies, which he intends to be a kind of putting into practice of the existential psychoanalysis for which he lays the groundwork in Being and Nothingness, offer the clearest picture of how he conceives those aspects of subjectivity that seem to escape conscious reflection. Some of the most prominent concepts he uses in this regard are “personalization”, “comprehension”, and le vécu [“the lived”]. All three of these major concepts serve as “functional equivalents” of the psychoanalytic unconscious for Sartre. The notion of the lived perhaps best captures the resonances between him and Lacan on this matter. In a late interview with his bibliographers Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, he explains, “I want to give the idea of a whole whose surface is completely conscious, while the rest is opaque to this consciousness and, without being part of the unconscious, is hidden from you… This notion of the lived is an instrument that I use but which I have not yet theorized…” (Sartre 1976, 127-128). Sartre’s intent to remain on the “surface” is striking. His explanation of the concept of “the lived” deserves even greater attention in that he also notes an explicit affinity with Lacan regarding his conception of the unconscious. He states, “I suppose [the lived] represents for me the equivalent of conscious-unconscious, which is to say that I no longer believe in certain forms of the unconscious even though Lacan’s conception of the unconscious is more interesting” (Sartre 1976, 127-128).​[5]​ He does not elaborate further, but based upon the account I have been presenting up to this point, I think there is evidence to support the view that Sartre reaches conclusions similar to Lacan’s regarding the unconscious aspects of psychical life. Of course, the primary reason Sartre insists on resisting the unconscious proper is precisely because it seems to commit one to the view that the psyche is a container with concealed depths. The concept of the lived by contrast carries the implication that, rather than being a hidden depth, there is a sense in which what is unconscious is something that is woven into the fabric of one’s day-to-day life and yet “overflows” (to use a Sartrean turn of phrase) one’s conscious understanding. In this way, Sartre’s primary critical target, whether he is aware of it or not, is arguably a depth psychology-informed ego psychological approach to thinking about the unconscious. 
This point is further bolstered by some of Sartre’s remarks in his biography of Jean Genet, Saint Genet: Comédien et Martyr. Here, as well as in his other biographies, the extent to which Sartre himself employs a certain notion of the unconscious is on full display. However, he seeks to maintain a delicate balance between, on the one hand, aspects of oneself that are opaque and resist easy understanding and, on the other hand, a robust sense of agency and responsibility even when it comes to those dimensions of subjectivity to which one seemingly has no reflective access. In Saint Genet, he straddles this divide by appealing to one’s first-person self-understanding and the way in which this sometimes fails to coincide with the third-person, objective perspective of others (what Sartre refers to as “being-for-self” and “being-for-others”, respectively): “in the majority of cases, and particularly if it is a matter of feelings, qualities, traits of character, or complex behavior, we are unable to bring our inner data into line with the information given by our external informants because the two are not of the same nature” (Sartre 2012, 32). These perspectives are irreducible. The qualities that others perceive one as having cannot be “internalized” because such qualities reflect the external relationship one has with others: “If I am told that I am intelligent and witty or dull-witted and coarse, this information refers to the effect I produce on others” (Sartre 2012, 32). We are thus confronted with two irreducible perspectives on the self, both of which seem to reflect something important. Sartre goes on to state: “It is therefore quite true that these qualities which are recognized in us elude our consciousness, not because they are hidden in an unconscious which is situated behind it, but because they are in front of us, in the world, and are originally a relationship to the other” (Sartre 2012, 32-33). Sartre again voices his aversion to the idea that those aspects of subjectivity that one cannot assimilate into one’s self-understanding exist in some hidden depth of the mind. On his view, the reason for the inassimilable character of certain aspects of subjectivity is that they emerge “out there” in the world through one’s relations to others. The unconscious appears in the gap between the two perspectives. 
For both Sartre and Lacan, what Freud dubs the unconscious is inscribed on the surface of conscious life. Put more simply, the surface is all there is. It is not a matter of discovering what lies beneath; rather, it is a matter of paying careful attention to what is “out there”. Toril Moi calls attention to this crucial point in her essay “Nothing is Hidden”. In the context of comparing the methods of detection practiced by Freud and Sherlock Holmes (and, of course, Dupin of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”), Moi questions whether the practices of psychoanalysis or detecting a crime (activities often associated with one another) are best captured by the metaphor of uncovering that which is hidden. Of Holmes specifically, she writes, “It’s not that the others look at the surface, whereas Sherlock looks beneath it. It is that he pays attention to the details they didn’t think to look at… Sherlock is a master in his field because he pays meticulous attention to what is there” (Moi 2017, 42). This, I think, is an apt characterization of Sartre’s and Lacan’s approaches to thinking about what goes by the name of the unconscious. The unconscious emerges through the polyvalent utterances issuing from the mouths of analysands and the resonance of the signifiers employed in constructing their free-associational monologues. Speaking of the ego, Sartre states that rather than being a kind of formal or material interior principle of unity for the subject, the ego “is outside, in the world” (Sartre 1960, 31). This statement could perhaps be applied equally well to the notion of the unconscious. 
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^1	  Writing of the ego, he states, “If it existed, it would violently separate consciousness from itself, it would divide it, slicing through each consciousness like an opaque blade” (Sartre 2004, 7). For Sartre, the unconscious is another such blade ushering in “the death of consciousness” (Sartre 2004, 7).
^2	  See, e.g., Gardner 1983; Frie 1997, 40; Tollini and Mueller 2015. 
^3	  Caws 2000, 22-23.
^4	  “The psychoanalyst among the structuralists was Lacan, who devoted a large part of his work to the problem of subjectivity. Lacan’s career began at least as early as Levi-Strauss’s, and it is evident from his collected writings that he represented a genuinely independent source for structuralism” (Caws 2000, 30). 
^5	  Sartre’s statement here is characteristic of his ambivalence toward psychoanalysis. It’s strange that he remarks that he “no longer believes in certain forms of the unconscious” because he never explicitly endorses the unconscious in any of his writings. Nevertheless, he appears to hint at the fact that he views it as a useful concept. This vacillation marks virtually all of his engagements with psychoanalysis. Often in one and the same breath, he both rejects and accepts various aspects of psychoanalytic theory, especially the notion of the unconscious. 
